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 Over the past 50 years there has been a significant decline in expressions of overt 
racism and prejudice in the United States. Well before the end of the 20th century, 
McConahay, Hardee, and Batts (1981) observed that public opinion polls demonstrated 
declines in racist responses. Part of this decline can be attributed to changes in societal 
norms, due to significant events such as, Brown v. Board of Education, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, and other legislative 
interventions that have resulted in blatant acts of discrimination becoming both immoral 
and illegal. Despite marked declines in overt racism, other forms of prejudice and 
discrimination continue to exist and affect the lives of racial minority group members and 
women in significant ways. The way in which racism, prejudice and discrimination affect 
peoples lives and society continues to be a concern for researchers (Dovidio & Gaertner, 
1986).  
 Since the publication of The Nature of Prejudice (Allport, 1954), the research and 
literature on racism, prejudice and discrimination has markedly increased. Duckitts 
(1992) analysis of historical trends in the study of prejudice from 1920 to 1990 led 
Dovidio (2001) to identify two general trends or waves of scholarship that reflects 
different assumptions and paradigms in the social psychological study of racial 
prejudice (Dovidio, 2001, p.830). The first wave of research can be identified from 
Duckitts (1992) analysis of the years 1920 to 1950, which represents prejudice as 
psychopathology. Prejudice was not viewed simply as a disruption of normal processing 
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but as an extreme deviation from normal thought or thinking. During this period 
personality and attitude tests were often administrated in an attempt to identify 
individuals characterized by racially prejudiced beliefs. Research conducted along these 
lines focused on measuring, describing, and monitoring the problem. Once these three 
items were recorded researchers then sought to find the cause or source of the problem. 
Quite simply, it was believed that if the problem (prejudice) could be identified and 
removed or treated that it would no longer exist and there would be no negative 
implications for the rest of society (Dovidio, 2001).  
 The second wave of research, which was from the late 1950s to the mid 1990s, 
targeted the opposite end of the spectrum and considered prejudice as a normal rather 
than abnormal process. This shift in focus heralded the examination of normal processes 
associated with societal norms and socialization and how these processes converged to 
support and perpetuate prejudice. This shift also emphasized the importance of changing 
social norms in determining how prejudice was conceptualized. Specifically, this second 
wave of research began to draw a distinction between the different ways in which 
prejudice is expressed (e.g., from overt to more covert forms of prejudice). However, this 
approach to studying racism and prejudice was problematic in that it relied exclusively on 
self-report measures, which are susceptible to social desirability demands and 
minimization of overt racist attitudes. Changes in societal norms have made racism and 
racist acts more taboo over the years. As a result, some of the reported decline in 
prejudice observed from the 1950s to the 1990s may have been due to the questionable 
accuracy of how people reported their race-related feelings and attitudes on these 
measures (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). 
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 Building on Duckitts (1992) analysis, along with research conducted over the 
past decade, Dovidio (2001) identified a third wave of research characterized by the 
conceptualization and examination of more subtle and covert types of racial bias, such as 
symbolic, modern, and aversive racism. Beginning in the mid-1990s to the present this 
third wave has emphasized a multidimensional view of prejudice, that attempts to assess 
individual differences in implicit and explicit racial attitudes and to distinguish covert or 
modern racists from truly nonprejudiced people (Dovidio, 2001). Also, advances in 
methodology have allowed researchers to test previously untestable questions regarding 
subtle forms of prejudice that were hypothesized during the end of Dovidios (2001) 
second wave. For example, whereas self-report measures could only estimate subtle or 
covert forms of racism, new technology and methodology were developed that provided 
for better understanding and measurement of implicit attitudes and beliefs (Dovidio, 
2001). Computer tasks such as the implicit association test (IAT) that measure response 
latencies now allow researchers to measure automatic or implicit attitudes and beliefs.  
The IAT is thought to measure implicit attitudes by examining automatic 
associations individuals make between certain stimulus objects (e.g., snakes) and 
evaluative attributes (e.g., dangerous) (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In other 
words, the IAT measures how closely individuals associate certain objects or groups with 
an evaluative attribute and assumes that the more automatic the association, the stronger 
the implicitly held attitude (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). The strength of these associations 
is measured by response latency times. Allport in 1954 wrote that negative experiences 
with prejudiced attitudes and behavior would have a lasting negative impact on African 
Americans. However, Allport was clearly referring to overt, blatant forms of racism. The 
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third wave began covering new ground by examining the effects of more covert, subtle 
forms of prejudiced attitudes and behaviors on particular target groups. This third wave 
of research has witnessed the dramatic emergence of literature examining implicit 
attitudes towards African Americans and other minority groups.  
For example, in one of the first studies of its kind, Greenwald et al., (1998) used 
the IAT to examine associations between stereotypical Black names (e.g. Latonya, 
Tashika) and pleasant word pairings compared to White names (e.g. Betsy, Katie) and 
pleasant word pairings in self-described unprejudiced Caucasian participants. They found 
that response latencies for White names paired with pleasant words were much shorter 
than Black names paired with pleasant words, suggesting an implicit negative bias toward 
Blacks among persons who describe themselves as unprejudiced. Similar findings have 
been observed substituting Black and White faces as stimulus objects on the IAT. 
Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, and Banaji (2000) presented undergraduate college 
students with pictures of Black faces and White faces and (similar to the original IAT), 
assessed response latencies for Black-pleasant and White-pleasant pairs. Again, 
participants showed stronger associations when pairing White faces with pleasant words 
than when pairing Black faces and pleasant words.  
Research has also extended this paradigm to examine implicit racial biases toward 
other minority groups. For example, Ottaway, Hayden, and Oakes (2001) used the IAT to 
examine associations between stereotypical White names (e.g., Alfred, Peggy) and 
pleasant word pairings compared to Hispanic names (e.g., Pedro, Junita) and pleasant 
word pairings in self-described Caucasian participants. Consistent with previous studies 
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(e.g., Greenwald et. al, 1995), they found that response latencies for White names paired 
with pleasant words were much shorter than Hispanic names paired with pleasant words.   
Despite the evidence demonstrating implicit racial bias toward a number of ethnic 
minority groups, there is an absence of literature examining this phenomenon as it 
pertains to Native Americans. Sue and Sue (1994) proposed that the reason for the 
general lack of literature on Native Americans may be the fact that Native Americans 
make up such a small percentage of the population in the United States, resulting in few 
Americans having personal contact, and an accompanying lack of awareness of issues 
facing Native Americans. More contemporary views suggest that the explanation goes 
well beyond this simplistic contact hypothesis. For example, Pewewardy (1998) has 
argued that the prevailing images of Native Americans are largely the creations of non-
Native people. He further suggests that those images have become the accepted version 
of Native American culture and leads people to view Native Americans as relics of the 
past rather than their more contemporary roles in society. To genuinely comprehend this 
point, one must understand the history of prejudice and racism that Native Americans 
have encountered throughout history.  
Unlike African Americans and other racial minorities in this country, Native 
Americans have a unique relationship and history with the United States federal 
government. From the time of first contact with European explorers and continuing 
throughout the mid 1800s Native Americans faced enslavement, genocide, forced 
removal, and land expropriation by the United States government. It is notable to point 
out that, shortly after the Civil War, amendments to the constitution recognized African 
Americans as human beings. Prior to this time, they were only considered three-fifths of a 
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person, according to the United States Census Bureau. During this same time Native 
Americans were presumed incapable of initiating action in a court of law, owning 
property, giving testimony in court, voting, or to possess the right to leave the 
reservation. In fact, except for veterans returning from World War I, Native Americans 
were not granted citizenship by the United States until the Indian Citizenship Act of 
1924, and because the right to vote was governed by state law, many states barred Native 
Americans from voting until 1948 (Wolfley, 1990). In addition, a number of laws have 
been passed over the years that required Native Americans to conform to Caucasian 
institutions, including the forced attendance of Native American children in boarding 
schools given to the charge of different Christian denominations (Deloria, 1969). In short, 
Native Americans have had, and continue to have, contentious political and economic 
relationships with the United States government. 
 Native Americans also continue to be dehumanized and cartoonized through a 
variety of images including sports mascots. Professional sport teams, universities, and 
high schools across the country use Native American mascots, such as the Redskins, 
Braves, Chiefs, and Savages. Such mascots portray Native Americans in either an 
idealized light or portray them as savage, bellicose characters. Sports mascots are 
frequently characterized in highly stereotypical ways, wearing headdresses, loincloths, 
and fake buckskin. Most often there is also the use of accessories such as tomahawks and 
face paint, and even sacred articles such as feathers and pipes. Mocking behaviors like 
the tomahawk chop, war whooping, and drum beating are also disrespectful to Native 
American culture (Pewewardy, 2001).     
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The Hollywood Indian (Pewewardy, 2001, p. 257) is another image of Native 
Americans that has been around since before the 1940s when Native Americans were 
portrayed as befeathered savages in cartoons. This image continued to be refined in 
movies in which Native Americans are depicted as the Noble Savage. These media-
created images have also helped to shape this countrys values, attitudes, and behaviors 
towards Native Americans. They also create stereotypes that aid in the dehumanization 
and deculturalization of Native Americans (Pewewardy, 2001). Despite this history of 
prejudice and racism there is a limited amount of research that involves the examination 
of peoples attitudes towards Native Americans.  
 Although the past ten years have seen a great deal of interest in examining 
implicit forms of racism, and a number of studies have been conducted that demonstrate 
implicit racial bias toward several ethnic minority groups (e.g., African Americans and 
Hispanics); no study to date has examined whether these same types of implicit racial 
biases apply to Native American as well. The purpose of the present paper is to examine 
the nature of implicit racism as it applies to Native Americans. The purpose of the current 
study is to examine whether the same results found on the IAT towards other minorities 












REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 Prejudice is commonly defined as an unfair negative attitude toward a social 
group or a person perceived to be a member of that group (Dovidio, 2001; p. 829). 
Although racism is related to the concept of prejudice and the terms are often used 
interchangeably, they really refer to two different processes. Whereas prejudice refers to 
negative attitudes and beliefs towards another group, racism refers to behaviors that result 
in denying full access or participation in society to members of particular racial groups. 
Historically, racism has been conceptualized as comprising three different categories: 
individual, institutional, and cultural (Jones, 1997). 
Individual racism characterizes behaviors at an individual level toward racially 
different others and is based on the assumption that individuals believe in the superiority 
of their own race over that of another. Essentially, individual racism involves the 
behaviors in which people engage that will help maintain those superior and inferior 
positions. Institutional racism is an institutional extension of individual racism (Jones, 
1997). Jones stated that institutional racism occurs when dominant civil institutions and 
formal organizations manipulate policies and procedures in ways that maintain advantage 
of particular racial groups over others. For example, establishing cut-off scores for 
standardized test as criteria for admission into college can be seen as a form of 
institutional racism, because minority students commonly have lower test scores and less 
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training and preparation for these standardized tests. The effect of institutional racism is 
to deny access, rights, choices, and mobility to members of racial minority groups within 
established institutions (Jones, 1997).    
Cultural racism incorporates both individual and institutional racism. Jones (1972) 
defines cultural racism as the individual and institutional expression of the superiority of 
one races cultural heritage over that of another race (p. 6). An example of cultural 
racism is the tendency to highlight the historical contributions of European Americans in 
this country to the exclusion of contributions made by members of racial minority groups 
(e.g., agricultural development, engineering expertise, constitutional forms of 
government).  
The research and literature on racism and prejudice has markedly increased over 
the past 50 years and throughout the years many theories about racism have emerged in 
the literature. In 1992, Duckitt conducted a historical analysis that focused on different 
explanations of racial prejudice. Based on his historical analysis Duckitt concluded that 
different theoretical orientations on racism emerge as a result of historical and social 
circumstances. Building on Duckitts analysis, Dovidio (2001) identified three different 
waves in which the literature defined and examined racism. 
The first wave of research started in the 1920s and lasted through the 1950s. 
During this wave of research, prejudice was approached as psychopathology and was 
seen as an unjustified, irrational, and extreme deviation from normal thought. During the 
majority of the first wave it was believed that racial prejudice was an unconscious 
defense mechanism that was developed to relieve tensions and problems that emanated 
either from a persons personality or in response to environmental stressors (Duckitt, 
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1992). Starting in the 1930s to the mid 1990s much of social psychology viewed 
attitudes and stereotypes as operating in a persons conscious awareness (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995). Traditionally, attitudes were seen as being made up of three different 
components, cognitive, affective, and behavioral (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Because 
this model rested on the belief that individuals were consciously aware of their attitudes, 
this also meant that measurement relied on explicit self-report and documentation of 
these attitudes was vulnerable to social desirability pressures (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).    
 The second wave of research, which was from the late 1950s to the mid 1990s, 
targeted the opposite end of the spectrum and considered prejudice as a normal rather 
than abnormal process.  This shift led to the examination of normal processes associated 
with broad social and cultural norms and how these processes converged to support and 
perpetuate racial prejudice. The normative approach to racial prejudice acknowledged 
that changing social norms would play an important role in addressing prejudice among 
the population as a whole.  
 Throughout the second wave the United States saw changes in race relations as a 
result of legislation, such as, Brown v. Board of Education, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Campbell (1971), Pettigrew (1975), 
and McConahay et al. (1981) observed that public opinion polls demonstrated declines in 
racism. Rossell (1978) questioned why, then, was the legislation designed to stop racial 
prejudice met with resistance, protests, and, in many cases, violence. These acts 
suggested that racial prejudice had not declined, but perhaps the attributions or 
explanations people gave for their racists actions had changed.   
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As a result, the second wave of research began to focus on the different ways in 
which prejudice may be expressed (e.g., from overt to more covert forms of prejudice). It 
became apparent, however, that racial prejudice could no longer be examined through the 
use of self-report measures, as had been done in the past, because self-report measures 
are susceptible to social desirability demands and minimization of overt racist attitudes. 
Indeed, because changes in societal norms made overt racist acts less socially acceptable, 
many theorists questioned whether reported declines in prejudice from the 1950s to the 
1990s were legitimate or due in part to the degree to which people were willing to 
genuinely report their race-related feelings and attitudes on self-report measures 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). In response to these questions, theories of racial 
ambivalence and unintentional racism, such as symbolic/modern and aversive racism, 
emerged during the latter part of the second wave and continued into the third wave.  
Sears and Kinder (1971), Sears and McConahay (1973), and McConahay and 
Hough (1976) invoked the theory of modern racism (referred to at the time as symbolic 
racism) to describe more contemporary forms of racial discrimination. Modern racism 
can be defined as the expression in terms of abstract ideological symbols and symbolic 
behaviors of the feeling that blacks are violating cherished values and making illegitimate 
demands for changes in racial status quo (p. 38) (McConahay & Hough, 1976). The 
main purpose of modern racism theory was to find practical solutions to measuring racist 
attitudes following major social change in the shadow of the Civil Rights Movement in 
the United States. As mentioned earlier, changes in societal norms had deemed overt 
racist attitudes and behaviors unacceptable, making results from self-report measures 
questionable.  
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Modern racism theory maintains that racism still widely exists in the United 
States, but that it is expressed in more subtle or indirect ways that do not outwardly 
violate societal norms. For example, in most instances the modern racist would not 
publicly support openly racist policies, such as segregation, but might oppose affirmative 
action mandates, claiming that such social policies violate principles of meritocracy. 
Modern racists may openly deny racist attitudes and avoid direct expressions of 
traditional or old fashioned racism, but may explain acts of discrimination in non-racial 
terms that are socially palatable, but result in similar racist institutional policies (Nail, 
Harton, & Decker, 2003).  
McConahay and Hough (1976) proposed that modern racism occurs because 
affective elements of racial attitudes develop early in life and are more resistant to change 
than are cognitive components. Because affective components of attitudes are slower to 
change, they have yet to catch up on new ideas regarding race and race relations. As a 
result, McConahay and Hough (1976) argue that although society has changed, old 
negative feelings still prevail and remain the guiding force in beliefs and actions toward 
racially dissimilar others. In a similar view, Sears (1988) theorized that modern racism 
stems from a combination of anti-black affect and traditional individualism values (e.g., 
meritocracy, Protestant work ethic, individual mobility). 
Aversive racism, like modern racism, recognizes that although overt expressions 
of racism have declined, contemporary forms of racial prejudice continue to affect the 
lives of racial minorities in subtle, yet significant ways (Dovidio, 2001). At the core of 
aversive racism is the notion that negative feelings and beliefs about other racial groups 
are rooted in normal and adaptive psychological processes involving both individual and 
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intergroup factors. Dovidio and Gaertner (1998) suggest that negative racial biases occur 
automatically, or outside of a persons conscious awareness, and are fueled by negative 
feelings toward other racial groups that are acquired through socialization. Dovidio 
(2001) asserted that because socially indoctrinated racial biases exist outside of 
awareness, aversive racists are able to simultaneously maintain genuine egalitarian self-
perceptions and engage in racially discriminatory behaviors. 
Building on Duckitts (1992) analysis along with research over the past decade, 
Dovidio (2001) identified what is known as the third wave of research on racial 
prejudice. The third wave focused on the conflict between a persons denial of personal 
prejudice (e.g., explicit attitudes) and his/her underlying unconscious negative feelings 
and beliefs (e.g., implicit attitudes). Dovidio characterized research in the third wave as 
being more concerned with issues of conceptualization and measurement of more subtle 
and covert types racial of bias. The third wave also emphasized a multidimensional view 
of prejudice, which attempts to assess individual differences in implicit and explicit racial 
attitudes and to distinguish covert or modern racists from truly nonprejudiced people.    
As the third wave gained momentum, social psychologists began making finer 
distinctions between explicit (i.e., deliberate) and implicit (i.e., automatic) cognitive 
processes (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Schacter, 1990). Greenwald and Banaji 
(1995) defined implicit attitudes as introspectively unidentified traces of past experience 
that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects 
(p. 8). They also hypothesized that these attitudes manifested themselves as actions or 
judgments that are under the control of automatically activated evaluation, without the 
performers awareness of that causation (p. 6).  
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Advances in methodology have allowed researchers to test previously untestable 
questions regarding subtle forms of prejudice that were hypothesized by researchers (e.g., 
McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1988,) during the second wave of racism literature. 
For example, whereas self-report measures could only estimate subtle or covert forms of 
racism, new technology and methodology have been developed that provide for more 
precise measurement of implicit attitudes and beliefs (Dovidio, 2001).  Computer tasks 
such as the implicit association test (IAT), that measures response latencies, now allow 
researchers to measure automatic or implicit attitudes.   
Implicit Association Test 
 The IAT is thought to measure implicit attitudes by examining automatic 
associations individuals make between certain target concepts (e.g., Black versus White) 
and evaluative attributes (pleasant versus unpleasant) (Greenwald et al., 1998). In other 
words, the IAT measures how closely (i.e., quickly) individuals associate certain objects 
or groups with an evaluative attribute and assumes that the more automatic (i.e., faster) 
the association, the stronger the implicitly held attitude (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). The 
strength of these associations is measured by response latency times. Specifically, it is 
believed that the stronger the association between two different stimuli the faster 
decisions will be made about them and response latencies will be shorter.    
 The IAT design consists of five steps (trial blocks). Blocks 1 and 2 introduce 
target concepts (Black and White) and the evaluative attributes (pleasant and unpleasant 
words). In the first trial block, participants will see one of two target concept categories 
on the right side of the computer screen and the other target concept category on the left 
side of the screen. For example, participants will see Black on the left of the screen and 
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White on the other side of the computer screen. Target concept stimulus words (e.g., 
happy) appear in the middle of the screen and the participant is asked to sort the stimuli 
into either the category on the right or the left using one of the two designated keys on the 
keyboard. The second block is performed in the same manner as block one, but instead of 
sorting the target concept stimuli, participants must sort the evaluative attribute stimulus 
words (e.g., pleasant and unpleasant) into correct categories. 
The third block combines target concepts and evaluative attributes into stereotype 
compatible (e.g., Black + unpleasant/White + pleasant) and stereotype incompatible (e.g., 
Black + pleasant/White + unpleasant) categories. In other words, instead of assigning 
stimuli to pleasant or unpleasant categories, participants now use the left or right 
designated keys to sort both target concept and attribute stimuli into combined categories 
that consist of both a target concept and an evaluative attribute (e.g., Black + pleasant 
and White + unpleasant). Block four consists of categorizing the target concept that was 
presented in trial block 1, but in reverse order. For example, if the participant were to be 
presented with the target concept of Black on the right side of the screen and White on 
the left side of the screen in block 1, the participant would see White on the right side of 
the screen and Black on the left side of the computer screen in block 4. Lastly, in block 
5, the participant is presented with the reverse of the stereotype compatible and 
stereotype incompatible combined target concept and evaluative attribute categories that 
were presented in block 3 (Dasgupta et al., 2000). 
 The IAT effect is defined as the difference between the two combined category 
trial blocks (stereotype compatible and stereotype incompatible). Specifically, means are 
computed for latency response times of stereotype compatible trial blocks (White + 
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pleasant/Black + unpleasant) and stereotype incompatible trial blocks (Black + pleasant/ 
White + unpleasant). The difference is then computed by subtracting the mean latency for 
stereotype compatible trial blocks from the mean latency stereotype incompatible trial 
blocks. A positive IAT effect indicates shorter response latencies when particular target 
concepts (e.g., Black) are paired with negative attributes than when paired with pleasant 
attributes and, subsequently, provides evidence for an implicit bias toward these target 
concepts.  
Empirical Demonstrations of the IAT 
Greenwald et al. (1998; Experiment 1) administered two different IATs to 32 
undergraduate students from introductory psychology courses at the University of 
Washington. Experiment 1 was designed to assess implicit attitudes toward two pairs of 
target concepts: flower names (e.g., rose, tulip, marigold) versus insect names (e.g., bee, 
wasp, horsefly) and musical instrument names (e.g., violin, flute, piano) versus weapon 
names (e.g., gun, knife, hatchet). Each of these target concepts were used in combination 
with pleasant (e.g., family, happy, peace) and unpleasant evaluative attributes (e.g., crash, 
rotten, ugly). It is also important to note that the target concepts were assumed to be 
universally positive (flowers, musical instruments) and negative (insects and weapons). 
Stereotype compatible combinations in the first experiment were flower + pleasant 
attributes and insect + unpleasant attributes; stereotype incompatible pairings were flower 
+ unpleasant and insect + pleasant. In the second IAT, musical instruments + pleasant 
attributes and weapon + unpleasant attributes constituted the stereotype compatible 
pairings; musical instruments + unpleasant attributes and weapon + pleasant attributes 
comprised stereotype incompatible pairings.   
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The first IAT effect was computed by subtracting the mean latency of stereotype 
compatible blocks (flower + pleasant versus insect + unpleasant) from stereotype 
incompatible blocks (flower + unpleasant versus insect + pleasant). The second IAT 
effect was calculated by subtracting the mean latency of stereotype compatible trials 
(musical instrument + pleasant/weapon + unpleasant) from stereotype incompatible trials 
(musical instrument + unpleasant/weapon + pleasant). Greenwald et al. found 
significantly shorter response latencies when flower and musical instrument names were 
paired with pleasant words (stereotype compatible) than when insect and weapon names 
were paired with pleasant words (stereotype incompatible), suggesting an implicit 
negative bias toward insects and weapons.  
In an attempt to demonstrate automatic expressions of race related stereotypes, 
Greenwald et al., (1998; Experiment 3) administered two IAT programs to 26 Caucasian 
undergraduate students from introductory psychology courses at the University of 
Washington. In the first of the two IAT programs, target concepts consisted of Black 
(e.g., Jamal, Leroy, Jerome) versus White (e.g., Adam, Harry, Brad) male names. Target 
concepts were used in combination with pleasant (e.g., family, happy, peace) and 
unpleasant evaluative attributes (e.g., crash, rotten, ugly). The same evaluative attributes 
from Experiment 1 were used. In this IAT, stereotype compatible combinations (White + 
pleasant/Black + unpleasant) were compared to stereotype incompatible pairings (Black 
+ pleasant/White + unpleasant).  
The second IAT task was identical except, instead of White and Black male 
names, participants were presented with White (e.g., Amanda, Courtney, Heather) and 
Black (e.g., Aiesha, Lakisha, Tawanda) female names. As in the first IAT the stereotype 
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compatible pairings consisted of White names + pleasant and Black names + unpleasant 
attributes and stereotype incompatible pairings consisted of Black names + pleasant and 
White names + unpleasant attributes.  
For both male and female names the average response times were significantly 
shorter for stereotype compatible blocks (White + pleasant/Black + unpleasant) than 
stereotype incompatible blocks (Black + pleasant/White + unpleasant). These findings 
were taken as evidence that more positive associations were demonstrated towards 
Whites than towards Blacks.   
Dasgupta et al. (2000) administered the IAT to 75 undergraduate students enrolled 
in introduction to psychology courses at the University of Washington. Each participant 
were administered two different IAT programs. One of the IAT programs used pictures of 
White and Black faces for the target concepts and pleasant and unpleasant (gentle, 
pleasure, paradise, joy, disaster, bomb, death, and poison) words for the evaluative 
attributes. The pictures used were acquired from the homepage of a public university; all 
people in the pictures were similar in dress, facial expression, and physical dimensions. 
In this paradigm the stereotype compatible blocks consisted of White faces + pleasant 
and Black faces + unpleasant attributes; stereotype incompatible blocks consisted of 
White faces + unpleasant and Black faces + pleasant attributes.  
The second IAT program used by Dasgupta et al. (2000) was identical except that 
pictures of White and Black faces were replaced with common White and Black names 
(e.g., Josh, Andrew, Brandon, Justin, Lamar, Malik, Jamel, and Rasaan) for the target 
concepts. The same evaluation attributes were used in both IAT programs. Stereotype 
compatible trial blocks consisted of White names + pleasant/ Black names + unpleasant 
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attribute pairings and stereotype incompatible blocks consisted of White names + 
unpleasant/Black names + unpleasant attribute pairings. 
As predicted, both IAT programs revealed significantly faster response latencies 
when White target concepts were associated with pleasant evaluative attributes and Black 
with unpleasant evaluative attributes (stereotype compatible) than when White target 
concepts were associated with unpleasant evaluative attributes and Black target concepts 
were associated with pleasant evaluative attributes (stereotype incompatible). These 
findings demonstrated the existence of a positive automatic preference for White target 
concepts when using both pictures and names as stimuli.                  
Ottaway, Hayden, and Oakes (2001; Experiment 2) conducted a two-part 
experiment that used the IAT to measure associations using popular Hispanic, Black, and 
White names as target concepts and pleasant and unpleasant words as evaluative 
attributes. Participants consisted of 32 self-identified Caucasian undergraduate students 
from Western Washington University. All participants were informed that the experiment 
could reveal attitudes that they held towards another race. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two different IAT groups (White versus Black and White versus 
Hispanic).  
Participants in the first group completed two different IAT tasks. In the first IAT 
scenario the target concepts consisted of Black (e.g., Jamaal, Leroy, Malcolm) and White 
(e.g., Alfred, Barry, Chip) male names. Target concepts were used in combination with 
pleasant (e.g., diamond, joy, glory) and unpleasant evaluative attributes (e.g., accident, 
bomb, disaster). The IAT effect was calculated by comparing stereotype compatible 
blocks (White + pleasant/Black + unpleasant) to stereotype incompatible blocks (Black + 
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pleasant versus White + unpleasant). The second IAT participants were presented with 
White (e.g., Crystal, Mallory, Peggy) and Black (e.g., Latoya, Tasha, Yolanda) female 
names instead of White and Black male names. Again, stereotype compatible 
combinations were White + pleasant and Black + unpleasant attribute pairings and 
stereotype incompatible combinations were Black + pleasant and White + unpleasant 
attribute pairings.  
The second group of participants also completed two different IAT tasks. The 
IAT tasks were identical to those completed by the first group, except that instead of 
White and Black male names, participants were presented with White (e.g., Alfred, 
Barry, Chip) and Hispanic (e.g., Jorge, Luis, Miguel) male names. Stereotype compatible 
trials consisted of White names + pleasant and Hispanic names + unpleasant attributes; 
stereotype incompatible trials consisted of Hispanic names + pleasant and White names + 
unpleasant attribute pairings. In the second IAT, target concept stimuli consisted of White 
(e.g., Crystal, Mallory, Peggy) and Hispanic (e.g., Felipa, Josefina, Margarita) female 
names. Again, stereotype compatible blocks were White names + pleasant and Hispanic 
names + unpleasant and stereotype incompatible blocks were Hispanic names + pleasant 
and White names + unpleasant attribute pairings.  
As predicted Ottaway et al. discovered that for both male and female names, 
average response times were significantly shorter for the stereotype compatible blocks 
(White + pleasant/Black + unpleasant and White + pleasant/Hispanic + unpleasant) than 
the stereotype incompatible blocks (Black + pleasant/White + unpleasant and Hispanic + 
pleasant/White + unpleasant). Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Greenwald et. al, 
1998; Experiment 3), it was found that response latencies for White names paired with 
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pleasant evaluative attributes were much shorter than when Hispanic and Black names 
were paired with pleasant evaluative attributes.  
Monteith, Voils, and Ashburn-Nardo (2001) administered two IAT programs to 
79 participants recruited from introductory to psychology and upper-division psychology 
courses at University of Kentucky. The first IAT program consisted of categorizing Black 
and White male names for the target concepts and pleasant and unpleasant stimuli for the 
evaluative attributes. All evaluative attributes and names used in both IAT programs were 
taken from Greenwald et al. (1998, Experiment 3). The second IAT was the same as the 
first except that participants were presented with Black and White female names. In both 
IATs, stereotype compatible trial blocks paired White names + pleasant and Black 
names + unpleasant attributes and the stereotype incompatible trial blocks paired White 
names + unpleasant and Black names + pleasant attributes. 
IAT effects were calculated for the means of stereotype compatible pairings 
(White + pleasant/Black + unpleasant) and stereotype incompatible pairings (White + 
unpleasant/Black + pleasant) in both IATs. As predicted, for both male and female names 
participants responded significantly faster to stereotype compatible combined categories 
than stereotype incompatible combined categories, indicating a positive bias toward 
Whites.       
McFarland and Crouch (2002, Experiment 1) administered an IAT similar to 
Greenwald et al. (1998, Experiment 3) to 81 undergraduate psychology students. 
Specifically, the target concepts consisted of White (e.g., Heather, Nancy, Mary) versus 
Black (e.g., Latonya, Shavonn, Tashika) female names and the evaluative attributes were 
moral (e.g., honest, helpful, kind) versus immoral (e.g., deceiving, selfish, cruel). 
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Combined categories were made up of stereotype compatible trials (White + moral and 
Black + immoral) and stereotype incompatible trials (Black + moral and White + 
immoral).  
The IAT effect was calculated by finding the difference between mean latencies 
for stereotype compatible blocks (White + moral and Black + immoral) and stereotype 
incompatible blocks (Black + moral and White + immoral). Results revealed that when 
participants were presented with the stereotype compatible pairings response times were 
shorter (faster) than when they were presented with stereotype incompatible pairings. 
Again, this study demonstrated the presence of negative implicit attitudes toward Blacks, 
and conversely, positive implicit attitudes toward Whites. 
Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, and Hart (2004, Experiment 1) administered the IAT 
to 98 White undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Princeton 
University. Target concepts consisted of Black and White pictures of undergraduates, and 
pleasant and unpleasant words were used for evaluative attributes. Frantz et al. (2004) 
used the same pleasant and unpleasant words that were used in Greenwald et al. (1998, 
Experiment 3). Stereotype compatible trial blocks consisted of Black names + unpleasant 
and White names + pleasant attribute combinations and stereotype incompatible 
combinations were White names + unpleasant and Black names + pleasant attribute 
combinations.  
Unlike previous studies, this study divided participants into three different groups. 
Each group was administered the same IAT, but participants were given different 
explanations for the purpose of the experiment and what the IAT program measured. 
Participants in group 1 were informed that the IAT measured their attitudes toward two 
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different racial group and racial bias. These participants were also told that research has 
shown that Whites show an automatic preference for White people. Participants in group 
2 were informed that the IAT was a program that measured their knowledge of cultural 
stereotypes. They were also told that research has shown that knowledge of cultural 
stereotypes is not related to personal beliefs or inter-racial attitudes and behaviors. The 
last group was given no extra information about the purpose of the IAT program. 
Participants in all groups were given the same set of instructions for completing the IAT 
program. 
As predicted, stereotype compatible trial blocks (White + pleasant/Black + 
unpleasant) yielded significantly shorter response times in all three groups. Group 1 
participants, who were explicitly informed that the IAT measured racial attitudes, 
produced a significantly larger IAT effect than the other two groups. These results 
indicated the presence of pro-White attitudes even when participants were informed of 
the purpose of the task. Indeed, pro-White attitudes were stronger when participants were 
informed that the IAT measured racial biases.  
   Cunningham et al. (2004) used the IAT in relation to neural components of 
implicit attitudes. A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), an IAT, and self-
report measures (i.e., Modern Racism Scale, Motivation to Respond without Prejudice 
Scale) were administered to 13 White participants. During the fMRI, participants were 
asked to press one of two buttons to indicate whether a certain visual stimulus appeared 
to the left or the right of a fixation point. Participants were presented with abstract 
pictures, white squares, and emotionally neutral Black and White faces. The faces were 
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presented to participants for two different lengths of time, 30 ms and 525 ms. All faces 
were presented an equal number of times in both exposure conditions.   
The IAT program consisted of White and Black faces for target concepts and 
good and bad words for evaluative attributes. This IAT program consisted of two 
different block trials. In the first block, participants were presented with stereotype 
compatible pairings (White + good and Black + bad). The second block of trials 
administered to participants were stereotype incompatible condition pairings (White + 
bad and Black + good). An IAT effect was computed by calculating the difference 
between mean latencies for the stereotype compatible and stereotype incompatible 
conditions. The IAT effect reveled that mean latency response times for stereotype 
compatible trials were significantly shorter than mean latency times for stereotype 
incompatible trials, indicating positive attitudes towards Whites relative to Blacks. 
Neural responses to the different faces were assessed by contrasting the fMRI 
signal for Black and White faces for 30 ms and 525 ms. When faces were presented for 
30 ms significantly more activity was observed in the right amygdala (area of the brain 
associated with emotion) when participants were presented with a Black face than when 
presented with a White face. In other words, amygdala activity increased when 
participants were presented with Black faces. These results indicate that more automatic 
emotional processing occurs for Black faces relative to White faces. Further analysis 
revealed that IAT effects were positively correlated with amygdala activity. In other 
words, greater pro-White responses on the IAT were associated with increased amygdala 
activity when participants were presented with Black faces.  
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Neural responses in the 525 ms condition were different from those observed in 
the 30 ms condition. No significant difference in amygdala activation was found in 
response to Black and White faces. In fact, amygdala activity was significantly lower in 
the 525 ms condition when compared to activity in the 30 ms condition. However, there 
was significantly more activity measured in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), an 
area of the brain associated with regulation and executive functioning. In this condition, 
IAT results correlated with amygdala activity after statistical analysis controlled for the 
discrepancies between indirect (IAT) and self-report measures of racial attitudes. In 
combination, these results indicate that brief exposure to racially dissimilar stimuli results 
in automatic emotional responses, but as time lapses, controlled processes come into play 
 perhaps in an attempt to moderate these automatic reactions.         
 The past ten years have seen a great deal of interest in examining implicit forms 
of racism. A number of studies have been conducted that demonstrate the ability of the 
IAT to detect implicit racial biases toward several ethnic minority groups (e.g., African 
Americans and Hispanics) (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998, Experiment 3; Monteith et al., 
2001; McFarland & Crouch, 2002, Experiment 1). The implicit nature of these biases is 
highlighted by the fact that negative implicit racial bias on the IAT can be observed even 
when individuals are made aware of the purpose of the task (e.g., Frantz et al., 2004, 
Experiment 1). Finally, there is evidence to suggest that implicit racial attitudes measured 
by the IAT are centrally mediated indicating that automatic processing of racially 
dissimilar stimuli involves activation of emotional areas of the brain (e.g., Cunningham et 
al., 2004). Despite the emergence of IAT research examining implicit bias toward racial 
minority groups, no published study to date has examined whether these same types of 
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implicit biases apply to Native Americans. The present study uses the IAT to explore if 
previous results can be replicated when using Native Americans and European 


























THE PRESENT STUDY 
Dovidio (2001) and McConahay, Hardee, and Batts (1981) have pointed out that 
reported rates of racism appear to be on the decline. However, these authors have also 
argued that this reported decline may not be due to actual decreases in racism, but to a 
transformation over the past 40 years from explicit overt racism to more implicit or 
covert forms of racism. Because the nature of racism has changed dramatically since the 
1960s, assessment methodologies have also undergone radical modifications to keep pace 
with the new face of racial bias.  
One of the newer methods of assessing implicit racial attitudes is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT). The IAT has been used to examine implicit attitudes across a 
number of psychological constructs including self-esteem (e.g., Fan & Wang, 2005), 
smoking (e.g., Huijding, de Jong, Wiers, & Verkooijen, 2005), homosexuality (e.g., 
Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001), and psychopathology (e.g., De Houwer, 2002). However, 
the Implicit Associations Test (IAT) is probably best known for its use as a measure of 
implicit bias related to race.  
In 2003, Avendano et al. (2003) reported on preliminary IAT data that attempted 
to replicate existing findings using Native American and European American target 
concept stimuli. In this study the IAT was administered to 35 self-identified Caucasian 
undergraduate students recruited from introductory psychology courses. Target concepts 
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consisted of words describing people of Native American (e.g., Cherokee, Navajo, Sioux) 
and European American (e.g., French, Dutch, Scottish) descent; evaluative attributes 
were positive (e.g., nice, pretty, pleasant) and negative (e.g., ugly, cruel, lazy) words. 
Combined categories were made up of stereotype compatible pairings (European 
American + positive and Native American + negative) and the stereotype incompatible 
pairings (Native American + positive and European American + negative).  
Results revealed that response times for stereotype compatible trials were 
significantly shorter than response times for stereotype incompatible trials. Consistent 
with studies demonstrating implicit racial bias toward African American and Latino 
populations (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998, Experiment 3), these findings indicated a 
significant negative implicit bias on the part of Caucasian college students toward Native 
Americans.  
Although these results were consistent with previous research, this experiment 
contained two important methodological confounds. One potential confound involved the 
stimuli words used as evaluative attributes. Specifically, some of the negative words used 
as evaluative attributes (e.g., lazy, ugly) were stereotypically negative words often used 
to characterize Native Americans in this country. The use of these words may have 
capitalized on these stereotypical associations and inadvertently strengthened the 
associations between negative attributes and target concept stimuli, resulting in faster 
response latencies for stereotypical compatible pairings. In addition, statistical analysis of 
the data did not correspond to the most recent recommended data analysis procedures 
proposed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). 
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Similar to Avendano et al. (2003), the purpose of the present study was to 
examine whether the type of implicit attitudes demonstrated by Caucasian individuals 
toward African Americans and Hispanics are also seen when Native Americans represent 
the target comparison group. The present study employed a methodology similar to 
Avendano et al., in that identical target concepts (Native American and European 
American) and evaluative attribute categories (positive and negative) were used. In an 
attempt to eliminate the potential pull of stereotypical evaluative words, the present study 
used attribute stimuli that are more generic and less group specific. Also, data analysis 
followed the scoring algorithm proposed by Greenwald et al. (2003). It was predicted that 
Caucasian college students would demonstrate a significant implicit negative bias toward 
Native Americans and a concomitant positive implicit bias toward European Americans. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that the average response latencies for stereotype 
compatible trials (European American + positive/Native American + negative) would be 
significantly shorter than response latencies for stereotype incompatible trials (Native 
American + positive/European American + negative).      
METHOD 
Participants and Procedures 
Participants consisted of 62 undergraduate students at Oklahoma State University 
that were recruited from psychology classes. Data from 7 participants were excluded 
because they did not identify themselves as Caucasian. Thus the final sample size 
consisted of 55 undergraduate students, 22 males and 33 females ranging in ages from 
18-24 years (M = 20.07), undergraduate students. This sample size surpasses the number 
of participants required to obtain statistical power of .80 and to reject the null hypothesis 
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with a two-tailed α= .05, r = .44 (Cohen, 1977 as cited in Greenwald et al., 2003). 
Participants received credit in their Psychology course in return for their participation. 
All participation was voluntary and participants were able to discontinue their 
participation at any time. The methodology for this study was approved by the 
Universitys Institutional Review Board (see Appendix D). 
Participants were brought into the lab individually where they completed a 
consent form, a demographic information sheet, Social Dominance Orientation and 
Attitudes towards Affirmative Action measures, and the computerized IAT program. Half 
of the participants received the self-report measures before completing the computer task 
while the other half completed the self-report measures after they completed the IAT 
task. Sessions took approximately 20 minutes and were conducted by a graduate student. 
Participants were assigned a subject number upon completion of the consent form and 
this number was used throughout the remainder of the experiment. 
Measures 
 Demographic Information Questionnaire. The demographic questionnaire 
(Appendix A) is self-report item that evaluated the participants age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, home state or country, religion, size of their hometown, parents 
occupation, and parents education level. 
Attitudes Survey. An Attitudes Survey (Appendix B) was created by combining 
both the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale and the Attitudes towards 
Affirmative Action questionnaire (Jost & Thompson, 2000). The SDO scale is a 16 item 
self-report questionnaire that evaluated the participants general attitudes about 
egalitarianism (opposition to equality-OE) and group-based dominance (GBD). The 
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higher the score on the SDO and the GBD subscale the more in favor a person is of group 
dominance. The higher the score on the OE subscale the more opposed one would be to 
equality. The Attitudes towards Affirmative Action scale is a 4-item measure that 
evaluated the degree to which the participants supported affirmative action. The higher 
one higher one scores on these four questions the more opposed to affirmative action they 
are. These measures were included in order to obtain more information about the 
participants beliefs held towards more socially significant ideologies.  
Jost and Thompson (2000) conducted a series of studies designed to adopt a 
multidimensional approach to measure and conceptualize social dominance orientation. 
They hypothesized that social dominance orientation consisted of two different 
ideological factors, opposition to equality (OEQ) and group-based dominance (GBD) and 
that these two factors would relate differently to other variables (e.g., attitudes towards 
affirmative action) depending on the participants race (i.e., African American or 
European American). Jost and Thompson (2000; Experiment 4) administered the social 
dominance orientation scale, measures of self-esteem, ethnocentrism, neuroticism, 
political conservatism, and attitudes toward affirmative action to 486 students (122 
African Americans and 364 European Americans) enrolled in an introduction to 
psychology course at the University of Maryland.  
 Correlation analysis revealed no significant relationship between group-based 
dominance and opposition to equality. However, the analysis did reveal that African 
Americans are significantly more supportive of affirmative action policies than European 
Americans. It was also found that opposition to equality was associated with rejection to 
affirmative action. Specifically, participants who were found to be the most opposed to 
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equality are more likely to reject affirmative action. One possible explanation for these 
results it that people are opposed to affirmative action not because they are opposed to 
unequal treatment (e.g., Hochschild, 1998), but because it reduces forms of inequality 
(Jost & Thompson, 2000).   
Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT program in the present study followed 
the same methodology used in previous studies (e.g., Avendano et al., 2003; Greenwald 
et al., 1998; McFarland & Crouch, 2000; Ottaway et al., 2001). To begin the IAT 
computer task, participants were presented with instructions on the computer screen. 
Participants were instructed to correctly sort words into one of two categories over the 
course of seven different trial blocks. Participants were presented with the following 
instructions on the computer screen: 
Participation in the computer task requires that you can read English fluently, and  
that your vision is normal or corrected to normal. If you do not consider yourself  
fluent in English, OR IF YOU ARE HAVING DIFICULTY READING THIS  
DESCRIPTION, PLEASE ask the experimenter now whether or not you should  
continue (you will receive participation credit in any case). 
 
Our research investigates cognitive processes used in making decisions. We are 
seeking to develop and test theories of the cognitive processes that occur inside 
and outside of awareness. On this task, different stimuli will be presented to you 
on the computer screen, and you will enter your responses on the keyboard. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SORTING TASK: For each of several sorting tasks you 
will be shown words one at a time in the middle of the computer screen. Your 
task is to sort each item into its correct category as fast as you can by pressing 
EITHER the D key or the K key. The categories associated with the D and 
K keys will be shown at the top of each screen. Please pay close attention to 
these category labels  they change each sorting task! 
 
For one of the sorting tasks you will be classifying words that are either  
POSITIVE or NEGATIVE 
In the other sorting task you will be classifying names that are either 
NATIVE AMERICAN or EUROPEAN AMERICAN 
For each task, your job is to place the word into one of two categories. 
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Participants were given five practice sessions and two test sessions, each 
consisting of 36 trials (Appendix C). Participants were informed when they were taking a 
practice trial and when they were taking a test trial. Throughout the task participants were 
informed if their answer was incorrect by the appearance of a red X in the middle of the 
computer screen. Participants needed to make the correct response before they were 
allowed to continue. After the completion of each block of trials participants were cued to 
examine the next page carefully and told which keys to use for the next set of trials. At 
the end of each test block participants were provided feedback on their accuracy and 
average response time in milliseconds.  
Trial Block 1 introduced the target concepts, Native American (Cherokee, 
Navajo, Sioux, Apache, Comanche, Iroquois) and European American (French, German, 
Dutch, Irish, Scottish, English). Block 2 introduced the positive (love, beauty, pleasure, 
happy, relief, miracle) and negative (poison, grief, hatred, rotten, hurt, tragedy) evaluative 
attributes. In Block 1 participants saw one of the two target concepts (Native American or 
European American) on the right side of the computer screen and the other target concept 
on the left side of the screen. For example, participants saw European American on the 
left side of the screen and Native American on the right side of the computer screen. 
Target concept stimulus words appeared in the middle of the screen and participants were 
asked to sort the stimuli (Cherokee, Dutch, Scottish, Navajo, French, and Sioux) into 
either the category on the left (European American) or the right (Native American) using 
the designated key on the keyboard; the D key was used to assign stimuli to the 
category on the left and the K key was used to assign stimuli to the category on the 
right. The second block worked in the same manner as Block 1, but instead of sorting 
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target concepts participants categorized positive and negative evaluative attributes. 
Positive appeared in the upper left side of the computer screen and negative appeared 
in the upper right side of the screen. Evaluative attribute categories remained in the same 
position on the computer screen throughout the task; target concept categories changed 
from the right to the left side of the screen and vice versa. Participants were given this 
information in the instructions presented to them on the computer.     
Block 3 (practice trial) combined target concepts and evaluative attributes so that 
they were mapped onto the same designated key. Instead of assigning stimuli into 
positive or negative target concept categories, participants used the D or K keys to 
sort stimuli into combined categories consisting of both a target concept and an 
evaluative attribute (e.g., European American or positive and Native American or 
negative). Trial Block 4 was the same as Block 3 except that participants were informed 
that it is a test trial.  
Block 5 consisted of categorizing target concept stimuli presented in Block 1, but 
in reverse order. For example, if participants were presented with the Native American 
target concept on the right side of the screen and European American on the left side of 
the screen in Block 1, participants were then presented with Native American on the left 
side of the screen and European American on the right side of the computer screen in 
Block 5. This reversed order for target concept category labels was maintained 
throughout the remainder of the IAT task.  
In Block 6 (practice trial) participants were presented with the reverse of the 
combined target concept and evaluative attribute categories presented in Blocks 3 and 4. 
For example, if participants were first presented with stereotype compatible combined 
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categories in Block 3 (European American or positive and Native American or negative) 
they were next presented with stereotype incompatible combined categories (Native 
American or positive and European American or negative) in Block 6. Block 7 was the 
same as Block 6, except that participants were informed that it is a test trial.  
  Presentation of target concept and evaluative stimuli words were randomized and 
were presented an equal number of times in each trial block. To control for order effects, 
even-numbered participants were presented with stereotype compatible categories first in 
Blocks 3 and 4; odd-numbered participants were presented the stereotype incompatible 





















 Greenwald et al. (2003) conducted a variety of analyses to improve on previous 
IAT scoring algorithms (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998). This new scoring algorithm was 
found to be superior to existing scoring algorithms in several ways. It was found to be 
more effective when measuring correlations with self-report measures given in 
conjunction with the IAT. Also, extreme response latencies (i.e., outliers) are corrected 
by eliminating response times that are too fast or slow. This new algorithm also controls 
for practice effects and participants prior experience with the IAT by including response 
times from both practice and test trials. The new algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003) was 
used in preparing the IAT response data for analyses. 
  Data preparation involved eliminating trials with latencies > 10,000 milliseconds 
(ms), and eliminating participant data with response times less than 300 ms in more than 
10% of trials. Mean latencies for each trial block were computed. Next, two separate 
pooled standard deviations (SDs) were calculated, one for Blocks 3 (e.g., stereotype 
compatible practice trials) and 6 (e.g., stereotype incompatible practice trials) and another 
for Blocks 4 (e.g., stereotype compatible test trials) and 7 (e.g., stereotype incompatible 
test trials). Response latencies for trials in which errors occurred were replaced with the 
block mean + 600 ms. The resulting values were then averaged for each trial block and 
two difference scores were computed, one for Block 6 and Block 3 (e.g., stereotype 
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compatible practice trials minus stereotype incompatible practice trials) and one for 
Block 7 and Block 4 (e.g., stereotype compatible test trials minus stereotype incompatible 
test trials). These differences were then divided by their associated pooled SDs and 
averaged. The resulting value represents the average difference between latencies for 
stereotype incompatible trial blocks and stereotype compatible trial blocks. This value is 
referred to as the IAT effect and is reported as D. A positive D value indicates that 
response latencies for stereotype incompatible trials are longer than response latencies for 
stereotype compatible trials. 
An univariate analysis of variance was conducted and revealed a significant IAT 
effect (D = .19; η2 = .30), F(1, 54) = 23.39, p = .001. Specifically, the results show that 
mean response latencies for the stereotype compatible pairings (Native American + 
negative/European American + positive) were significantly shorter than mean latencies 
for stereotype incompatible pairings (Native American + positive/European Americans + 
negative); 854.10 ms and 971.14 ms. respectively. These results support the hypothesis 
that Caucasian college students possess a negative implicit bias towards Native 
Americans when compared to European Americans.     
 Pearsons correlation analyses were conducted to test for significant correlations 
between D and the self-report measures administered to the participants. The correlation 
analyses revealed a significant correlation between D and the Attitudes toward 
Affirmative Action Scale, r(54) = .28, p = .04. Specifically, as D increases (as negative 
bias towards Native Americans increases) the more opposed to affirmative action the 
participants rated themselves on the Attitudes toward Affirmative Action survey. No 
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other significant correlations were found among the other self-report measures 




























 The present study was designed to investigate whether or not Caucasian college 
students held a negative implicit bias towards Native Americans utilizing the Implicit 
Associations Test (IAT) developed by Greenwald et al, 1998.  Previous research studies 
have been conducted that demonstrated the ability of the IAT to detect implicit biases 
toward other ethnic minority groups, such as, African Americans and Hispanics (e.g., 
Greenwald et al., 1998, Experiment 3; Monteith et al., 2001; McFarland & Crouch, 2002, 
Experiment 1). The present study also administered two self-report measures to see if the 
IAT correlated with peoples reported attitudes towards social dominance and affirmative 
action. 
The present study hypothesized that the findings would be consistent with results 
of previous research (i.e., Greenwald et al. 1998; Dasgupta et al., 2000). The present 
study replicated the IAT methodology used by Greenwald et al. 1998, but replaced Black 
and White names with European and Native American tribes or countries of origins for 
the target concepts. The results of the present study were consistent with that of previous 
research and the current hypothesis. Specifically, response times for stereotype 
compatible pairings (European American + pleasant/Native American + negative) were 
significantly shorter than the stereotype incompatible pairing (European American + 
negative/Native American + positive). These results indicate the presence of a negative 
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implicit bias towards Native Americans among Caucasian college students. It was 
hypothesized that IAT scores would correlate with both the Social Dominance 
Orientation Scale and the Attitudes towards Affirmative Action Survey. Results showed 
that IAT scores only correlated with the Attitudes towards Affirmative Action survey. 
Specifically it was found that as negative bias towards Native Americans increased so did 
the participants opposition to affirmative action. 
McConahay, Hardee, and Batts (1981) observed that public opinion polls 
demonstrated a decline in racist responses and while to some this could be attributed to a 
decline in racism in the United States others have argued that racism has not declined, but 
that it has simply changed from overt to more covert or implicit forms (e.g. Greenwald et 
al. 1998; Dovidio and Gaertner, 1989). In order to test this theory Greenwald et al., 
(1998) developed the IAT to measure a persons reflexive, non-conscious responses and 
using mean latencies to measure implicit bias, thus eliminating the confounds that occur 
through the use of self-report measures. The present study supports previous research 
findings and expands the literature to include Native Americans as another minority 
group that the IAT has been used to demonstrate a negative implicit bias towards.  
  Criticisms of the IAT include potential confounds associated with the 
participants familiarity with the stimuli, differences between participants cognitive 
ability, and whether the IAT is demonstrating a negative implicit bias against a group or 
demonstrating a positive bias towards ones own group. Several studies have examined 
the effects of stimulus familiarity on the participants response rate on the IAT. These 
studies have found that no significant differences exist in response latency between 
participants who were highly familiar with the stimuli and those who were less familiar 
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with the stimuli used in the IAT (Rudmen, Greenwald, Mellot, & Schwartz, 1999; 
Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banajii, 2000; Ottaway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001; 
Brendl, Markman, Messner, 2001; Dasgupta, Greenwald, & Banajii, 2003). However, 
significant latency differences were found when completely unfamiliar stimuli, such as 
nonsense strings, were used as stimuli on the IAT (Brendl, Markham, & Messner, 2001; 
Greenwald & Nosek, 2001).  The results of these studies led researchers to determine that 
differences were the result of implicit bias rather than familiarity to the stimulus. 
 Another major criticism of the IAT is the effects of cognitive skill or fluency on 
latency response times. In other words, are response times for the stereotype incompatible 
pairings (e.g., Native American + Positive/European American + Negative) longer due to 
the participants cognitive inability to stifle incongruence or due to the participants 
negative bias toward the target concept? McFarland and Crouch (2002) examined the 
effects of cognitive fluency on IAT latency response times and found a general slowing 
in response times did occur. However the new scoring algorithm designed by Greenwald, 
Nosek and Banajii (2003) substantially moderates the effects of cognitive fluency on IAT 
latency times. The new scoring algorithm that was used for the present study reduces the 
correlation of IAT effects with the average latency of responding to a smaller value.  
 Lastly, Brendl, Markman and Messner (2001) posed the possibility that IAT 
effect may not reflect negative bias towards an outgroup (e.g., Native Americans), but 
rather a positive bias for the participants ingroup. Specifically the results of the present 
study could be interpreted not as a negative bias towards Native Americans, but as a 
neutral attitude of Native Americans and a more positive evaluation of European 
Americans. Another possible interpretation of the results posed by Brendl, Markman and 
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Messner (2001) is that participants evaluated both target stimuli (Native Ameircans, 
European Americans) as positive, but evaluated European Americans more favorably. 
The reverse of this scenario could be that participants evaluated both target stimuli as 
negative, but viewed Native Americans as more negative than European Americans.  
These alternative explanation warrant attention and to address this potential 
confound the present study included a self-report measure of Attitudes toward 
Affirmative Action. Self-report results indicate that as negative bias towards Native 
Americans increase so does the participants opposition to affirmative action. Therefore, 
if the evaluations of the target stimuli are neutral for Native Americans and positive for 
European American, positive or negative towards both target stimuli, they are still related 
to a socially relevant topic. It should be noted that a strong opposition to affirmative 
action does not necessarily imply biased ideals against a particular group. Jost and 
Thompson (2000) reported that opposition to affirmative action may not be motivated by 
racism or a desire to dominate a minority group, but rather to an ideological opposition 
to egalitarianism that serves to justify the current social system (Jost and Thompson, 
2001, p. 20).  
In conclusion the present study indicates a negative bias toward Native 
Americans, when compared to European Americans and as this bias increases so does 
ones opposition toward affirmative action. The findings of this study expands on the 
literature regarding race and the IAT to include Native Americans as another racial group 
that the IAT has successfully demonstrated a negative implicit attitudinal bias. Further 
research regarding the IAT and Native Americans could be expanded to examine whether 
Native Americans are associated with less than human or primitive traits. The results of 
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this experiment could provide empirical data to support of refute the argument that the 
use of Native Americans in the media results in Native Americans being viewed as 
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1. Age:   2. Gender:    3. Race/Ethnicity:     
4. What is your home state or country?         
5. Religion:      
6. Which category best describes your hometown or place where you spent the majority of your upbringing 
(circle one)? 
1) Large city (e.g. New York, Dallas, Chicago) 
2) Midsize city of suburb (e.g. Oklahoma City, Little Rock, Wichita) 
3) Small city (e.g. Stillwater) 
4) Large town (less than 20,000 people) 
5) Small town or rural (less than 1500 people) 
 
For items 7 and 8, refer to the parents/guardians with whom you spent the majority of your 
upbringing. 
 
7. What are/were your parents/guardians education level (circle one for each)? 
      Father 
 1) Middle School 
 2) High School 
 3) Some college (specify # of years:   ) 
 4) College degree 
 5) Post-graduate degree 
      Mother 
 1) Middle School 
 2) High School 
 3) Some college (specify # of years:   ) 
 4) College degree 
6) Post-graduate degree 
 
8. What are you parents/guardians occupations? 









ATTITUDES SURVEY     
               
Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by circling the number 
associated with your answer. 
 
Strongly Disagree   Disagree Dont Agree or Disagree       Agree    Strongly Agree 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
1.  Some groups of people are just more worthy than others. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
2.  It would be a good idea if all groups could be equal. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
3.  In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
4.  Group equality should be our ideal. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
5.  Affirmative action for minorities in education is unfair to Whites. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
6.  All groups should be given an equal chance in life. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
7.  Superior groups should dominate inferior groups. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
8.  We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
9.  Affirmative action in education gives opportunity to qualified minorities who might not have had a chance without it. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
10. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
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 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
11. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
12. Increased social equality would be a good thing. 
 




PLEASE CONTINUE ON THE NEXT PAGE! 
 
Strongly Disagree   Disagree Dont Agree or Disagree       Agree    Strongly Agree 
 





13. Affirmative action forces colleges and universities to admit unqualified students. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
14. Its probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
15. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
16. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
17. We should strive to make incomes more equal. 
  
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
18. No one group should dominate in society. 
  
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
19. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
 
 1          2          3             4     
5 
 
20. Affirmative action helps make sure that the American education system remains competitive. 
 











Sequence of Trial Blocks 
 
               Items assigned to left-key Items assigned to 
right-key 
Blocks    No. of trials   Function        response   response  
   
     1  36   Practice European American    Native American      
     2  36   Practice Positive words    Negative words 
     3  36   Practice Positive words + European   Negative words + 
Native  
     American     American 
     4  36   Test  Positive words + European   Negative words + 
Native 
     American     American 
     5  36   Practice Native American    European American 
     6  36   Practice Positive words + Native   Negative words + 
European  
     American     American  
     7  36   Test  Positive words + Native   Negative words + 
European  
     American     American   
  
Note. In order to control for order effect, the positions of Blocks 1, 3, and 4 are 


































Pearson Correlation 1 .527(**) .921(**) .196 .187 
  Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .000 .152 .171 
  Sum of Squares and 
Cross-products 2078.436 739.600 2818.036 198.109 
18.48
7 
  Covariance 38.490 13.696 52.186 3.669 .342 
  N 55 55 55 55 55 
Opposition 
to Equality 
Pearson Correlation .527(**) 1 .817(**) .431(**) .177 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .000 .001 .197 
  Sum of Squares and 
Cross-products 739.600 947.200 1686.800 294.400 
11.77
6 
  Covariance 13.696 17.541 31.237 5.452 .218 
  N 55 55 55 55 55 
Social 
Dominance 
Pearson Correlation .921(**) .817(**) 1 .330(*) .208 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   .014 .127 
  Sum of Squares and 
Cross-products 2818.036 1686.800 4504.836 492.509 
30.26
3 
  Covariance 52.186 31.237 83.423 9.121 .560 






.196 .431(**) .330(*) 1 .279(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .152 .001 .014   .039 
  Sum of Squares and 
Cross-products 198.109 294.400 492.509 493.527 
13.43
2 
  Covariance 3.669 5.452 9.121 9.139 .249 
  N 55 55 55 55 55 
D  Pearson Correlation .187 .177 .208 .279(*) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .171 .197 .127 .039   
  Sum of Squares and 
Cross-products 18.487 11.776 30.263 13.432 4.686 
  Covariance .342 .218 .560 .249 .087 
  N 55 55 55 55 55 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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